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Abstract
Stevens’ scales of measurement are often used in texts outlining statistical approaches for geographers.
However, it is sometimes overlooked that these are not universally accepted, and indeed the theory
surrounding them is contested. This progress report reviews the key ideas of these scales, and discusses a
number of the problems they raise – most notably the fact that certain kinds of data are omitted. The value of
an axiomatic approach to measurement scales and appropriate statistical techniques is then considered. The
report concludes by considering further areas where these ideas may be developed.
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I Introduction: What are
measurement scales?
The concept of scales of measurement (Stevens,
1946) has been used in the physical and social
sciences for decades. Essentially, these are a
categorization of the kinds of variable (or attri-
bute in GIS vector model terminology) that may
occur. Identifying the scales of measurement for
a given set of variables is intended to provide
guidelines for the appropriate method for data
analysis – and possibly visualization tools – that
can be applied in a meaningful way. This has
been an issue that has long contributed to
debates in quantitative human geography –
since data relating to people, the economy,
migration, travel, social well-being and atti-
tudes to place and many other topics contain
examples of measurement on all of these scales.
It is hoped that understanding the relationship
between scales of measurement and data
analysis and visualization techniques may pro-
vide some guidance when working with diverse
forms of quantitative geographical data. I begin
by overviewing and highlighting recent interest
in this topic, and then review and critique the
underlying ideas, and consider fruitful areas for
further research.
II Context and review
Scales of measurement have received much
attention since Stevens’ paper was first pub-
lished, and they inform research currently
ongoing. Since the theory outlines structure in
data types that informs choices on how it may be
processed, it takes on new relevance in an era of
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big data and infographics. For example, this has
been considered in the framework of creating a
unifying ontology of data visualization (Voigt
and Polowinski, 2011), which then leads to con-
sideration of data visualization techniques for
city models (Me´tral et al., 2012, 2014), and pos-
sibly city dashboards. Big data processing also
draws on these ideas, exemplified by Bimonte,
Villanova-Oliver, and Gensel (2012) – who
consider measurement scale as one factor in
developing methods for automatic aggrega-
tion of data on web-based servers. Ha¨rtwig,
Mu¨ller, and Bernard (2014) go on to consider
this in the context of spatio-temporal data
analysis. It is also highlighted as an issue
when considering strategies for mapping
American Community Survey-based esti-
mates of statistics, and their associated errors
(Francis et al., 2015).
In terms of visualization, Harvey (2017) pro-
poses a novel theoretical framework approach,
part of which refers to the scales of measure-
ment paradigm for visualizing big data. Finally,
in a visualization context, Lin, Hanink, and
Cromley (2017) draw attention to its relevance
in the context of isopleth mapping. Consider-
ation of measurement scales in the analysis of
social and economic data continues to influence
thinking. In a recent PhD thesis Jensen (2014)
considers the use of compositional data in
econometric modelling, and the approach here
is informed in part by measurement scale. Also,
Erguven (2014) considers influences of mea-
surement theory on statistical analysis of survey
data. Thus, the key idea and Stevens’ proposed
scales continue to be drawn upon as an aid to
understanding many current aspects of quanti-
tative spatial data analysis.
The idea, and the proposed scales, need little
introduction to readers who have attended a
basic ‘quantitative methods for geographers’
or similar course, but, following Chrisman
(1995), it is helpful to list Stevens’ initial
specification of these scales (Table 1).
These can be interpreted as an ordered set –
the ‘Basic empirical operations’ are essentially
cumulative – so that ‘Determination of equality’
is possible on each scale, ‘Determination of
greater or less’ is possible on all scales except
nominal, and so on. The mathematical group
structure is essentially a set of transformations
which can be applied to measurements in each
scale such that the determination of equality
basic empirical operation associated with each
scale will still hold. Again, these form a
sequence since each group transformation is a
subset of the previous one. For example,
x0 ¼ axþ b is a monotonic increasing function,
provided a > 0. It should be pointed out that the
further condition a > 0 should be added to the
mathematical group structure entries for inter-
val and ratio. Mapping all x values onto a
Table 1. Stevens’ original four scales of measurement.
Scale Basic Empirical Operations Mathematical Group Structure
Permissible statistics
(invariantive)
NOMINAL Determination of equality Permutation group x0 ¼ f ðxÞ – f ðxÞ
means any one-to-one substitution.
Number of cases, mode
ORDINAL Determination of greater
or less
Isotonic group x
0 ¼ f ðxÞ – f ðxÞ means
any monotonic increasing function
Median, percentiles
INTERVAL Determination of equality
of intervals or differences
General linear group x
0 ¼ ax þ b Mean, standard deviation,
rank order correlation
RATIO Determination of equality
of ratios
Similarity group x
0 ¼ ax Coefficient of variation
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constant b (interval) or zero (ratio), as would be
the case if a were zero, does not preserve the
respective determinations of equality for these
scales. Negative values reverse the ordering. I
refer to this group of four scales as the NOIR
group (from the initial letters of Stevens’ orig-
inal nomenclature). Their interconnection is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Around this set of scales of measurement,
Stevens develops the idea of measurement
theory. This argues that the scale of measure-
ment adopted dictates the method of statistical
analysis that should be used, in terms of either
statistical tests or descriptive statistics. It also
sets out a rigorous definition of a scale of mea-
surement as a mapping of some quality (abstract
or physical) onto a numeric value. Examples
include a physical distance to a number of
meters or feet, or a response to a certain govern-
ment policy on to an attitude scale (for a rigor-
ous exposition see Krantz et al., 1971; Suppes
et al., 1989; Luce et al., 1990). These ideas per-
sist in many ways at the time of writing. Many
statistical textbooks contain some version of
Stevens’ table as a guide to choosing appropri-
ate statistical methods given certain kinds of
data, essentially basing their guide on the NOIR
scales. Some software packages use this frame-
work to classify variables. This could involve
‘greying out’ certain statistical procedures that
would be inappropriate for certain variables
according to Stevens’ dictum. For example,
defining variables in SPSS requires variables
to be classified into the near-NOIR grouping
of ‘nominal’, ‘ordinal’ or ‘scale’. The last,
although confusingly named, is a union of inter-
val and ratio scale data.
Although the NOIR grouping is perhaps the
first attempt to classify scales of measurement
in this way, and arguably the first to propose this
concept in a formal framework, other commen-
tators note that it is by no means complete. The
NOIR scales of measurement themselves form
an ordinal scale in that the list of group structure
transforms as defined above form a cumulative
set – and the notion of comparison x < y in this
context can be defined in terms of subsets of
permissible operations. This self-reference may
be seen as aesthetically satisfying, but unfortu-
nately the NOIR set of scales is not exhaustive
and some non-NOIR scales do not fit well into
this ordered framework. Chrisman (1995) notes
that circular data do not find an intuitive place
here: ‘Angles seem to be ratio, in the sense that
there is a zero and an arbitrary unit (degrees,
grads or radians). However, angles repeat the
cycle. The direction 359 is as far from 0 as
1 is’ (p. 274). A similar argument could be
applied to time-of-day or time-of-year data.
Others have also identified kinds of mea-
surement that do not fit comfortably into this
framework, including Stevens himself (1959),
who subsequently argued for a fifth scale (sit-
ting at the same level as interval) for logarith-
mic measures.
Other attempts to identify scales of measure-
ment also exist. Some of these are simpler than
Stevens’, and some more complex. Indeed Van
den Berg (1991) found that the identification of
Figure 1. Scales of measurement – as suggested by
Stevens.
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distinct scales of measurement was an area of
notable disagreement among statistical experts.
Nelder (1990) identified various modes of data,
comprising continuous counts, continuous ratios,
count ratios and categorical. The last of these are
sub-classified into ‘nominal’, orderedon thebasis
of an underlying scale, and ordered without an
underlying scale. Here there are more than the
four levels proposed by Stevens, although argu-
ably these donot fit with his overall idea that level
of measurement dictates statistical technique.
Although many sources still use Stevens’ ini-
tial classification as a basis for structuring sta-
tistical analysis (despite the fact that Stevens
himself has amended this), the ideas are con-
tested. The contestation falls broadly into two
groupings: those who support measurement the-
ory but disagree in some way with Stevens’
approach, and those who oppose measurement
theory per se.
Below, I review both critiques and offer fur-
ther suggestions. I proceed by outlining some of
the basic ideas in greater detail, then focusing on
the critiques, and finally reflecting on these. I
consider levels outwith Stevens’ original list,
and place them within the ‘Mathematical Group
Structure’ framework suggested in that list. In
particular, types of spatial data and measure-
ment scales will be considered in this frame-
work as well as the concept of permissible
statistics applied in this context.
III Detailed view: ‘Permissible’
statistical operations for the NOIR
scales
In addition to outlining scales of measurement
Stevens suggested appropriate statistical tests
for each of the levels, termed permissible. These
are tests whose outcomes and interpretation
remain unaltered when the mathematical group
structure transform is applied to the data. For
example, two-sample t-tests are not permissible
for nominal level data, even if the nominal lev-
els are denoted numerically. Suppose we had
two samples, uniquely labelled numerically, but
thought to be nominal, as in Table 2.
Applyinga t-test to thesevalueshas the following
result, rejecting a two-tailed test of H0 : m1 ¼ m2
at the 5% significance level (Table 3).
However, if the data really are nominal, the
results should be invariant to a transform
x 7!f ðxÞ provided f ðxÞ is unique for any x value.
However, consider the transform
f ðxÞ ¼ x if 4  x  8;
12 x otherwise

This function ‘reverses’ the integers between
four and eight, leaving the rest unchanged, and
meets the uniqueness criterion. The transformed
data are shown in Table 4.
And the test performed on the transformed
data gives the result in Table 5.
In this case the test fails to reject H0. Even if
the test outcome were the same the test statistic
would have been altered – the p-values would
be altered. This example illustrates Stevens’
principle: the transform above should leave the
outcome invariant at the nominal level, but it
Table 2. s1 and s2.
s1 6 7 8 9 10 11
s2 1 2 3 4 5
Table 3. Two-sample t-test: s1 and s2.
t - Statistic 5.20
p-value (two-tailed) <0.001
Table 4. f(s1) and f(s2).
f ðs1Þ 6 7 8 3 2 1
f ðs2Þ 11 10 9 4 5
Table 5. Two-sample t-test: f ðs1Þ and f ðs2Þ.
t - Statistic 1.82
p-value (two-tailed) 0.10
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actually changes the t-statistic. Therefore t-tests
are not meaningful for this level of measurement.
In Stevens’ terminology, the two-sample t-test is
‘not permissible’ for nominal level data. Conver-
sely, a transform of the kind axþ b or ax would
not change the value of the test statistic or the
p value, so two-tailed t-tests are permissible for
interval or ratio levels.
Similarly, ‘permissible statistics’ listed in
Stevens’ table are essentially statistics that are
consistent with the appropriate group structure
transform, in the sense that if fx1; . . . ; xng are a
set of measurements on a given level, f ðxÞ is a
group structure transform for this level, and
x ¼ gðx1;    ; xnÞ is a permissible statistic then
f ðxÞ ¼ g

f ðx1Þ;    ; f ðxnÞ

. If the measure-
ment scale is somehow ‘recalibrated’ via f ðxÞ,
then the recalibrated summary statistic should
be the summary statistic of the recalibrated
measurements. However, this is not always
strictly the case, and Stevens’ theoretical over-
view is ‘informal’ in some parts. Although stan-
dard deviations are permissible for interval
scale data, the group structural transform here
is f ðxÞ7!axþ b, but if the standard deviation of
a sample is s, then the standard deviation of the
transformed data is as, and not asþ b.
In addition to the idea of a ‘mathematical
group structure’ and the associated ‘basic
empirical operations’, another characteristic of
levels of measurement is that of a meaningful
binary operator. For example, for nominal level
variables x and y the binary operators x ¼ y and
x 6¼ y are meaningful, as they have logical out-
comes of true or false. However, x  y is not
meaningful, since there is no concept of order in
nominal variables. Other levels of measurement
will have different meaningful operators.
IV Scales of measurement outwith
the basic theory
Since others have identified levels of measure-
ment outwith Stevens’ original table, how do
these fit in? For example, are there group struc-
ture transforms and associated permissible sta-
tistics for angular data, or log interval data and if
so, what are they?
1 The ‘cyclic’ scale
The cyclic scale is the generic name by which
all scales of the kind given in the example of
angles above will be designated. Typical uses
in human geography might include analysis of
directions of movement (Faggian et al., 2013;
Brunsdon and Charlton, 2006), the time of day
of crimes (Brunsdon and Corcoran, 2006), or
crowd movement dynamics (Wirz et al., 2012).
The idea is that they range over a set of num-
bers from 0 to C but that the distance between 0
and C is zero, and for d1; d2 2 ½0;C=4 the dif-
ference between C  d1 and d2 is d1 þ d2. In
other situations the difference is defined by
ordinary subtraction. Thus, for angles, C ¼
360 and the difference between 359 and 1
is 2, x may be thought of as a point of the
circumference of a circle (see Figure 2).
The set of group structure transformations
take the form x7!f ðxÞ where f maps x onto a
revised scale with a possibly different value for
C. An offset can be added to the transformed x
so that the zero position on the circle is altered.
A switch from ‘clockwise’ to ‘anticlockwise’ is
also possible so that 3
4
C and 1
4
C are transposed
in the diagram. These operations occur when
Figure 2. The cyclic scale of measurement.
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switching between degrees and radians, where
C changes from 360 to 2p, the zero position
moves from 12 o’clock to 3 o’clock, and direc-
tion switches from clockwise to anti-clockwise.
Stevens-type permissible statistics are outlined
in Fisher (1993). Averaging may be exemplified
by the circular mean x~- defined by:
x~¼ tan1
X
i
sinðxiÞ;
X
i
cosðxiÞ

for x in radians, where the bivariate form
tan1ðy; xÞ computes the arctangent, taking
into account the correct quadrant given the signs
of the argument. For positive x and y,
tan1ðy; xÞ ¼ tan1ðy=xÞ. If x is not in radians,
it is converted to radians for the calculation of
this statistic. The result is converted back to the
initial units afterwards. For spread, typical sta-
tistics include the circular standard deviation
n ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ln 1
n
X
i
sinðxiÞ
 !2
þ 1
n
X
i
cosðxiÞ
 !20@
1
A
vuuut
where again x is in radians, and converted to this
scale otherwise.
There is no well-defined ordering for this
scale of measurement, due to its cyclic nature,
so order-based statistics (such as quantiles) have
no meaning. Effectively, in relation to Figure 1,
the cyclic scale forms a new branch away from
the existing hierarchy at the nominal level, since
operations applicable to the nominal scale (such
as the mode) may be applied here, as may other
operations unique to cyclic measurements.
However, operations that are valid for ordinal
measurements are not valid for the cyclic case.
2 The ‘log interval’ scale
Suppose I have two pairs of running shoes
(denoted A and B here). I take ten 10 km
runs in each pair and measure the average
pace of each run (in minutes per km – see
data in Table 6). I wish to test the hypothesis
that the average running pace in both pairs of
shoes is the same.
In each run the speed is calculated in km/h
(pace divided into 60). If we assume the pace to
be measured on a ratio scale (it has a well-
defined zero of being stationary!), a t-test may
be used to test this hypothesis since, in Stevens’
terms, it is permissible. Here insufficient evi-
dence is found to reject this hypothesis, using
a two-tailed test, as seen in Table 7.
Now consider the same test, using speed
instead of pace (Table 8). This time there is
evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
It could be argued that if there is no strong
reason to favour one hypothesis over the other;
then a valid group structure transform is
f ðxÞ7!60=x, which is non-linear, and hence
rapidity is measured on an ordinal scale. This
Table 6. Average pace and speed for two pairs of running shoes for repeated 10 km runs.
Shoes Measurement Individual Runs
A Pace Min/Km 6.45 6.43 5.80 5.93 6.08 6.37 6.64 6.30 6.61 6.06
Speed Km/h 9.30 9.32 10.34 10.12 9.87 9.42 9.04 9.53 9.08 9.90
B Pace Min/Km 6.46 6.42 6.45 6.47 6.37 6.68 7.00 6.73 6.17 6.36
Speed Km/h 9.28 9.35 9.30 9.28 9.41 8.98 8.57 8.92 9.72 9.43
Table 7. Two-sample t-test for null hypothesis of
equal pace.
t - Statistic 2.1000
p-value (two-tailed) 0.0501
Table 8. Two-sample t-test for null hypothesis of
equal speed.
t - Statistic 2.1220
p-value (two-tailed) 0.0480
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being the case, the result of the hypothesis
test may be based on a Wilcoxon test which
compares the ranks of the speed (or the pace)
for each pair of shoes, which gives the results
in Table 9.
Now the p-value implies the null hypothesis
fails to be rejected. Furthermore, the p-value
itself is notably increased, suggesting the power
of the test has diminished.
An alternative approach might be to trans-
form by taking logs (of both pace and speed),
noting that logðPaceÞ ¼ logð60Þ  logðSpeedÞ.
The logged quantities are related by a linear
transform, and form an interval scale. In this
case a t-test is permissible in both cases. For
pace, see the result in Table 10.
Applying the same test to logged speed
measurements gives t¼2.112, which is equiv-
alent to the above (except for a change in
sign) with identical p-value due to the use of
a two-tailed test.
This suggests the existence of another scale
of measurement, whose group structure trans-
form is logðxÞ7!alogðxÞ þ b. Given that x > 0,
this may be stated as x 7!bxa (for a different b).
Stevens proposed this in a later paper. For this
scale the set of group structure transforms is a
subset of those for ordinal scales of measure-
ment but not a superset of those for interval or
ratio scale. These form a ‘parallel’ scale to the
interval scale – superseding the ordinal scale but
incomparable to interval and ratio scales.
3 The ‘absolute’ scale
In ‘absolute’ scale, no transform apart from the
identity transform f ðxÞ7!x is permitted. This
typically applies to count data. Counts of
objects cannot be multiplied by an arbitrary lin-
ear transform and maintain their meaning. Like
ratio data, they clearly have a well-defined zero.
It could arguably also include unobservable
attributes, such as probability (which, in order
for the laws of probability to hold, must be in the
range ½0; 1) or correlation – which must lie in
the range ½1; 1. This scale can be distin-
guished from ratio scale by the absence of units
of measurement.
4 An augmented set of scales
Putting the extra scales together with those put
forward by Stevens prompts re-drawing of the
diagram in Figure 1, giving the updated arrange-
ment shown in Figure 3, where arrows with
dotted shafts show relationships involving the
scales augmenting the original classification.
The scales themselves are shaded in a lighter
colour. The simple ‘ladder’ relationship seen
earlier is no longer apparent.
V Further issues with
measurement theory and NOIR
Criticisms of Stevens’ original set of scales
include that it is incomplete, and that it is incon-
sistent and therefore potentially confusing. For
example, Spearman’s (1904) rank correlation
coefficient (r) is frequently suggested for ordi-
nal measures (though it is essentially Pearson’s
coefficient with interval or ratio measurements
replaced by their rank, an ordinal measure).
Thus, although considering the relationship
between the scales of measurement may prove
useful, the idea of prescribing and proscribing
certain analytical techniques on the basis of
measurement scale contains inconsistencies in
practice. The paradoxical use of Spearman’s
coefficient could be circumnavigated by using
Table 9. Two-sample Wilcoxon test for null
hypothesis of equal speed.
w - Statistic 75
p-value (two-tailed) 0.063
Table 10. Two-sample logged t-test for null hypoth-
esis of equal speed.
t - Statistic 2.1120
p-value (two-tailed) 0.0489
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the Kendall coefficient of concordance t instead
(Kendall, 1938). This is based on pairs of obser-
vations ðxi; yiÞ and ðxj; yjÞ being either concor-
dant such that either xi < xj and yi < yj or
xi > xj and yi > yj or discordant if either
xi > yi and yi < yj or xi < xj and yi > yj. With
these definitions, and assuming no ties in the
data sets,
t ¼ 2ð#concordant pairs #discordant pairsÞ
nðn 1Þ
Note this only requires comparison
operators.
Despite the contradictory nature of r as a
descriptor of association for pairs of ordinal
measurements, its use still persists, possibly
dominating the use of t. A similar issue exists
for the Mann-WhitneyU -test, as it is a nonpara-
metric equivalent to the t-test based on the sums
of the ranks of observations in two samples.
Intended for use with ordinal measurements, it
is based on sums of the ranks – an operation not
permissible in Stevens’ theory. In these objec-
tions some confusion arises: although Spear-
man’s correlation coefficient and Mann and
Whitney’s test both rely on non-permissible
operations, they apparently do the jobs that they
are intended to do. In the light of this observa-
tion, does the concept of levels of measurement
scale actually offer any useful contribution?
Rather than questioning its relevance, some
consider it to be harmful, and that adhering to its
recommendations might lead to misleading or
inappropriate analysis. One of the earliest cri-
tiques is from Lord (1954), who argued that the
appropriateness of data analysis depends on
context and the question it is designed to
answer, rather than the scale of measurement
attributed to the data (Velleman and Wilkinson,
1993). For example, the floor number of an
apartment block is an ordinal scale measure-
ment, but if all floors had the same room height,
it effectively functions as an interval scale mea-
surement. Regressing this quantity against
sound level for some source of noise at ground
level (say passing trains) would have meaning
given this context.
Guttman (1977: 105) argues similarly: ‘Per-
mission is not required in data analysis. What is
required is a loss function to be minimized.’
Here, ‘loss function’ encapsulates a penalty for
making a wrong decision or a wrong summary
statistic in the context of the question being
asked. This should be defined differently in dif-
ferent situations. Further, Guttman argues, ‘If a
mathematician gives or withholds “permission”
without reference to a loss function, he [sic]
may be accessory to helping the practitioner
escape the reality of defining the research prob-
lem’ (p. 105). Although the idea of a ‘loss func-
tion’ is perhaps in itself reductionist, the last
statement highlights a distinction between the
mathematician and the practitioner, and perhaps
a distinction between the (pure) mathematician
and the data analyst. Attempting to base recom-
mendations for appropriate data analysis tech-
niques solely on a set of abstract axioms risks
overlooking the issues that the researcher ini-
tially wished to address.
Whereas one may disagree that human geo-
graphy is a science, an important point is made
Figure 3. Scales of measurement: An augmentation
of Stevens’ classification.
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on the role of experience. An axiomatic
approach to scales of measurement has more
in common with pure mathematics than a sci-
ence. Velleman and Wilkinson (1993: 7) rein-
force this argument: ‘Experience has shown that
in a wide range of situations that the application
of proscribed statistics to data can yield results
that are scientifically meaningful, useful in
making decisions, and valuable as a basis for
further research.’ Following these proscriptions
could hinder the yielding of such results, sug-
gesting that axiomatic measurement theory
should be considered harmful.
Objections to measurement theory certainly
cast doubt on the utility of an axiomatic
approach. However, knowing something about
the characteristics of data types does inform the
process. For example, in many contexts the
numbers associated with nominal categories are
simply proxies for some other attribute, such as
political party or gender. Carrying out arithme-
tical operations on these makes no sense when
context is also considered. Similarly, although
the average rank of scores in one group could be
compared to that for another, there are limits to
which this approach is useful. On the other
hand, in the apartment floor example, a differ-
ence in mean ordinal measures may have further
meaning, as each level suggests a constant
change in height. Fractions of these also imply
differences in height. Thus, considering types of
data does inform understanding, although rather
than providing a guiding theory to data analysis
of itself, it provides contextual information.
With this in mind, it is also helpful to
consider other suggested classifications of
data. These are generally in a less rigorous
setting than those of Stevens, but they do
shed light on different approaches to analysis.
One such list of classifications was suggested
by Tukey (1977):
	 Names
	 Grades (ordered labels such as Freshman,
Sophomore, Junior, Senior)
	 Ranks (starting from 1, which may repre-
sent either the largest or the smallest)
	 Counted Fractions (bounded by zero and
one; these include percentages, for
example)
	 Counts (non-negative integers)
	 Amounts (non-negative real numbers)
	 Balances (unbounded, positive or nega-
tive values)
The list is interesting if not axiomatic. It
offers greater detail than Stevens’ groupings,
and brings in the concept of constrained values
– Amounts may not be negative, Counted Frac-
tionsmust lie between zero and one, and Counts
must be integers greater than or equal to zero.
Such constraints help consideration of the
nature of variables, and provide concepts
beyond those considered by Stevens’ classifica-
tion. They are also helpful in suggesting appro-
priate statistical models for data. For example,
identifying a quantity as a counted fraction sug-
gests that a binomial distribution may be an
appropriate model. Similarly, Poisson models
may be appropriate for count data.
VI Further issues
Tukey’s suggestions are well established, yet
have made less of an impact on textbooks of
quantitative geography than Stevens’ initial
ideas despite the fact that few quantitative
human geographers currently adhere to an axio-
matic approach. Yet despite the fact that Tukey
identifies more richness in variety of data types
than Stevens’ approach, more recent considera-
tions suggest that even more kinds of data
should be considered, many of which are rele-
vant to quantitative human geography.
In many situations, locations in geographical
space (modelled as a map projections or a point
on the surface of a globe) are in themselves a
data type. Like directional data, in general they
have no implicit ordering, but mathematical
operations such as addition, subtraction and the
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computation of means (in this case centroids)
are meaningful. Referring again to the network
diagram in Figure 1, this is another offshoot
from ‘nominal’. Further understanding of direc-
tional data can be gained by regarding direc-
tions as two-dimensional points constrained to
lie on a circle of unit radius. The circular mean
is the projection of the centroid of a set of direc-
tions represented in this way onto the circle of
unit radius, as demonstrated in Figure 4.
All scales of measurement are subject to
measurement error. However, further uncer-
tainty occurs in the assignment of categories
to nominal measures if the categories are
unclearly defined. It is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to define the concept of a materially
deprived household in a crisp way. In such
cases, the idea of fuzzy sets is often applied.
However, how fuzzy nominal entities fit into
this framework, and what statistical operations
are meaningful for such data, is not yet clear.
Work such as that by Fisher (1999) provides a
strong starting-point for this.
Returning to issues related to multi-
dimensional data, most basic classifications of
scale focus on the unidirectional, where rela-
tionships between entities are generally based
on ordering. However, there are other kinds of
relationship. Geographical regions could be
regarded as measurements on a nominal scale.
Intuitively there is no order relationship
between them but a notion of adjacency, where
a pair of regions share a border, could be repre-
sented. If this scale is tentatively named ‘nom-
inal positional’, there is more structure in the
scale of measure than in ‘pure’ nominal data.
Statistics such as Moran’s-I (Moran, 1950)
identify the degree of linkage between a nom-
inal positional scale and an interval or ratio
scale measurement.
VII Closing discussion
Although much of the material here has been
considered in previous discussions, some of
these ideas take on a new significance in the era
of data science, and in particular geographical
data science. There may be good arguments that
an axiomatic view on measurement types is not
the most advantageous way to proceed, yet an
understanding of different kinds of data, or
(in Stevens’ framework) different measurement
scales, and an understanding that such typolo-
gies are themselves contested ideas, plays an
important role in data science. Even if one does
not accept the notion that certain kinds of
Figure 4. Constrained 2D interpretation of a circular mean.
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analysis or statistical summaries may be pro-
scribed purely on the basis of measurement
scale, it is informative to reflect on the combi-
nation of research question, kind of data, and
type of visualization or analysis that is taking
place. These ideas are an aid to thought in this
area, even if they do not provide a set of con-
crete rules.
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